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ON THE GAME INTERPRETATION OF A SHADOW PRICE
PROCESS IN UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS UNDER
TRANSACTION COSTS
DMITRY B. ROKHLIN
Abstract. To any utility maximization problem under transaction costs one
can assign a frictionless model with a price process S∗, lying in the bid/ask
price interval [S, S]. Such process S∗ is called a shadow price if it provides the
same optimal utility value as in the original model with bid-ask spread.
We call S∗ a generalized shadow price if the above property is true for the
relaxed utility function in the frictionless model. This relaxation is defined as
the lower semicontinuous envelope of the original utility, considered as a func-
tion on the set [S, S], equipped with some natural weak topology. We prove
the existence of a generalized shadow price under rather weak assumptions
and mark its relation to a saddle point of the trader/market zero-sum game,
determined by the relaxed utility function. The relation of the notion of a
shadow price to its generalization is illustrated by several examples. Also, we
briefly discuss the interpretation of shadow prices via Lagrange duality.
1. Introduction
A possible approach to the analysis of optimization problems under transaction
costs consists in their reduction to the correspondent problems in frictionless
models. The main point of this approach is to determine a frictionless price
process S∗, called a shadow price, lying in the bid/ask price interval [S, S] and
ensuring the same optimal utility value. This method was successfully applied to
some continuous time portfolio optimization problems in the recent papers [17],
[13], [14], [12]. Previously in the same context a shadow price process with such
interpretation explicitly appeared in [20].
In discrete time setting for the case of finite probability space the existence of
a shadow price in an investment/consumption optimization problem was estab-
lished in [18]. Inspired by this result, we consider an optimal investment problem
in discrete time model over general probability space. It should be mentioned
that very recently in the paper [3] the existence of a shadow price process was
established in general multi-currency continuous time market models under short
selling constraints.
The main feature of the present paper is the game interpretation of a shadow
price process. As it was was mentioned in the cited papers, a shadow price
can be interpreted as a least favourable frictionless price from trader’s point of
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view. So, it is natural to consider a trader/market zero-sum game determined
by trader’s utility Ψ(S, γ), regarded as a function of frictionless price process S
and an investment strategy γ. Moreover, one can expect that a pair (γ∗, S∗),
composed of an optimal strategy γ∗ and a shadow price S∗, corresponds to a
saddle point of Ψ.
However, an application of customary minimax theorems (see [28]) is not
straightforward. Firstly, usually Ψ is not convex or quasiconvex in S. Secondly,
in general it is not lower semicontinuous in a topology, ensuring the compactness
of the set [S, S]. To overcome at least the second difficulty, for each γ we pass
to the lower semicontinuous envelope Ψ̂ of Ψ in some natural weak topology
on [S, S], and introduce the corresponding notion of a generalized shadow price
process S∗.
The method, involving a consideration of the lower semicontinuous envelope
(relaxation) of the objective functional is extensively used in analysis of varia-
tional problems [9], [2], [7]. In the present context it appears that the relaxed
problem fits nicely into the framework of the intersection theorem, proved by
Ha [15] (see Theorem 2 below). Applying this result, in Section 2 we establish
the existence of a generalized shadow price and the minimax property of Ψ̂ un-
der rather weak assumptions (Theorem 1). Moreover, if there exists an optimal
solution γ∗ of the original utility maximization problem, then a pair (γ∗, S∗),
where S∗ is a generalized shadow price, is exactly the strategic saddle point of
the game, determined by the relaxed utility function Ψ̂(S, γ) (Theorem 3).
Thus, the advantage of passing to the relaxed problem is twofold: (1) the
existence of a generalized shadow price process S∗ is guaranteed under weak
assumptions, (2) the relaxed utility Ψ̂ has nice minimax and saddle-point prop-
erties.
The relation of the notion of a shadow price to its generalization is illustrated
by several examples in Section 3. If the original utility function Ψ(S, γ) is already
lower semicontinuous in S in an appropriate topology, the proposed approach
gives the existence of a shadow price (Examples 1 and 2). Another interesting
case appears when Ψ̂ 6= Ψ but it is still possible to give a convenient analytical
description of the saddle points (S∗, γ∗) of Ψ̂. If γ∗ is an optimal solution of
the original utility maximization problem under transaction costs, Ψ(S∗, γ∗) =
Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗) and the optimality of γ∗ for the functions γ 7→ Ψ(S∗, γ), γ 7→ Ψ̂(S∗, γ)
is characterized by identical conditions, then a generalized shadow price S∗ is in
fact a shadow price (Example 3).
Furthemore, we give an example of two-step model on a countable probability
space with linear utility functional such that a generalized shadow price exists
and a shadow price is not (Example 4). Independently an example of the same
nature in three-step model was constructed in [3]. In spite of the nonlinearity
of the objective functional, the advantage of the latter example is the use of
logarithmic utility, while in Example 4 the utility contains a Banach limit. We
find it interesting to test our approach on the example of [3]. It appears that the
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”unsuccessful candidate” for a shadow price, mentioned in [3], is a generalized
shadow price (see Example 5 of the present paper).
It is worth mentioning that usually a ”shadow” or ”equilibrium” resource
prices are associated with an optimal solution of the Lagrange (or Fenchel) dual
problem. In Section 4 we trace this connection in the problem under consider-
ation, confining ourselves to the case of finite probability space. We show that
a shadow price is equal to the relation of equilibrium prices of stock and bond.
The related calculations indicate quite explicitly that the zero duality gap and
the solvability of the Lagrange dual problem immediately imply the existence of
a shadow price process. This point seems promising for generalizations, concern-
ing the existence of a shadow price. However, Examples 4 and 5 show that this
way is not so easy in the infinite-dimensional setting. See also the comments,
concerning the papers [5], [6], in the introductory section of [3].
2. Main result
Consider a trader, who can distribute his wealth between a bond with zero
interest rate (and price 1) and a risky asset (stock). As usual, he acts in random
setting, described by a probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with discrete-time
filtration F = (Ft)
T
t=−1, F−1 = {∅,Ω}. The stock can be sold at the bid price
St and purchased at the ask price St at a time moment t. It is assumed that
0 < St ≤ St and the processes S, S are F-adapted. A trading strategy is
determined by an F-adapted portfolio process (βt, γt)
T
t=−1, consisting of βt untis
of bond (or cash) and γt units of stock. A trading strategy is called self-financing
if any change in risky position is compensated by the cash flow:
∆βt = St(∆γt)
− − St(∆γt)
+, t = 0, . . . , T,
where ∆at = at − at−1, x+ = max{x, 0}, x− = max{−x, 0}. To fix the values
β−1, γ−1 we assume that the trader starts from one unit of bond: β−1 = 1,
γ−1 = 0. Moreover, at the terminal date T the asset holdings are converted to
cash: γT = 0. Hence, trader’s terminal wealth is given by
XT (γ) = 1 +
T∑
t=0
(St(∆γt)
− − St(∆γt)
+), γ−1 = 0, γT = 0. (2.1)
For the frictionless model (S = S = S) this formula shapes to the customary
form:
XT (γ) = 1 + (γ ◦ S)T := 1 +
T∑
t=1
γt−1∆St.
Denote by L0(Ft) the set of equivalence classes of P-a.s. equal Ft-measurable
real-valued random variables. The sets Lp(Ft), 1 ≤ p < ∞ and L∞(Ft) consist
of p-th power P-integrable and P-essentially bounded elements of L0(Ft) respec-
tively. We equip L0 with the topology of convergence in probability, induced by
the metric
ρ(f, g) = E
|f − g|
1 + |f − g|
. (2.2)
4 DMITRY B. ROKHLIN
Unless otherwise stated, the sets Lp, p ∈ [1,∞); L∞ are considered as Banach
spaces with the norms
‖f‖p = (E|f |
p)1/p , ‖f‖∞ = ess sup |f |.
We consider two possible choices of spaces, containing the portfolio strate-
gies γ: γt ∈ Ls(Ft), s ∈ {0,∞}. However, in each case we equip Ls(Ft) with
the topology τt of convergence in probability. Denote by F the vector space∏T−1
t=0 L
s(Ft) with the product topology τ =
∏T−1
t=0 τt and let Y be a convex
subset of F. Since the values γ−1 = 0, γT = 0 are fixed, in what follows γ is con-
sidered as an element of F (except for Section 4). We allow portfolio constraints
of the form γ ∈ Y .
Assume that St, St ∈ L
q(Ft) for some q ∈ [1,∞]. Put τwt = σ(L
q(Ft), Lp(Ft)),
where 1/p + 1/q = 1. So, τwt is the weak topology of L
q for q ∈ [1,∞) and the
weak-star topology of L∞. In any case the set
[St, St] = {St ∈ L
q(Ft) : St ≤ St ≤ St}
is τwt -compact. Since the closedness of [St, St] is clear, this assertion follows from
the τwt -compactness of the unit ball for q ∈ (1,∞] and the uniform integrability
of [St, St] for q = 1. Denote by E the vector space
∏T
t=0 L
q(Ft) with the product
topology τw =
∏T
t=0 τ
w
t and put
X = [S, S] :=
T∏
t=0
[St, St].
A functional
Φ : Lr(FT ) 7→ [−∞,∞], r = min{s, q}.
Φ is called monotone if Φ(X) ≥ Φ(Y ) whenever X ≥ Y , X, Y ∈ Lr(FT ) and
quasiconcave if
Φ(α1X + α2Y ) ≥ min{Φ(X),Φ(Y )}
for allX, Y ∈ Lr(FT ), α1+α2 = 1, αi ≥ 0. It is easy to see that Φ is quasiconcave
iff the upper level sets {X ∈ Lr(FT ) : Φ(X) > β} are convex for all β ∈ R.
We admit that trader’s preferences are represented by a monotone quasiconcave
functional Φ. Recently such framework attracted a considerable attention in
connection with quasiconvex risk measures [4], [11].
The optimal value of the utility maximization problem under transaction costs
and portfolio constraints, represented by Y , is defined as follows
λ = sup{Φ(XT (γ)) : γ ∈ Y}. (2.3)
Note that XT (γ) ∈ Lr(FT ) under the above notation.
Along with (2.3) consider the optimization problem in a frictionless model,
where the stock price is given by an adapted process S ∈ [S, S]:
µS = sup{Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)T ) : γ ∈ Y}. (2.4)
Following [18] we call an adapted process S ∈ [S, S] a shadow price if µS = λ.
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We are going to introduce a modification of the last notion. Put
Ψ(S, γ) = Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)T )
and denote by Ψ̂(·, γ) the τw-lower semicontinuous envelope (relaxation) of Ψ(·, γ)
as a function on [S, S] (see [21], Definition 2.1.13):
Ψ̂(S, γ) = sup
V ∈N (S)
inf
S′∈V
Ψ(S ′, γ),
where N (S) is a local base of the topology τw, restricted to [S, S]. As is known
(see [21], Proposition 2.1.15), Ψ̂(·, γ) is the largest τw-lower semicontinuous func-
tion majorized by Ψ(·, γ). Note that
Φ(XT (γ)) ≤ Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ Ψ(S, γ), S ∈ [S, S] (2.5)
since XT (γ) ≤ 1 + (γ ◦ S ′)T , S ≤ S ′ ≤ S and Φ is monotone.
Consider instead of (2.4) the optimization problem for the relaxed functional
Ψ̂:
µ̂S = sup{Ψ̂(S, γ) : γ ∈ Y}. (2.6)
We call S a generalized shadow price if µ̂S = λ.
Looking at (2.5), we immediately conclude that any shadow price S∗ is a
generalized shadow price:
λ = sup
γ∈Y
Φ(XT (γ)) ≤ sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S∗, γ) = µ̂S∗ ≤ sup
γ∈Y
Ψ(S∗, γ) = λ.
If Φ is quaisiconcave then Ψ(S, ·), Ψ̂(S, ·) are quasiconcave as well. Indeed, for
α1 + α2 = 1, αi ≥ 0 and γi ∈ Y we have
Ψ(S, α1γ
1 + α2γ
2) = Φ(α1(1 + (γ
1 ◦ S)T ) + α2(1 + (γ
1 ◦ S)T ))
≥ min
i=1,2
Φ(1 + (γi ◦ S)T ) = min
i=1,2
Ψ(S, γi).
Let Ψ̂(S, γi) > β. Take V i ∈ N (S) such that infS′∈V i Ψ(S
′, γi) > β and put
V = V 1 ∩ V 2. The inequality
Ψ̂(S, α1γ
1 + α2γ
2) ≥ inf
S′∈V
Ψ(S ′, α1γ
1 + α2γ
2) ≥ min
i=1,2
inf
S′∈V
Ψ(S ′, γi) > β
means that the upper level sets {γ ∈ Y : Ψ̂(S, γ) > β} are convex.
Now we state the main result of the present paper.
Theorem 1. Let Φ be monotone and quasiconcave, St, St ∈ L
q(Ft), t = 0, . . . , T
for some q ∈ [1,∞]. Then there exists a generalized shadow price S∗ ∈ [S, S]
and the following minimax relations hold true:
λ = sup
γ∈Y
Φ(XT (γ)) = sup
γ∈Y
inf
S∈[S,S]
Ψ̂(S, γ) = sup
γ∈Y
inf
S∈[S,S]
Ψ(S, γ) (2.7)
= inf
S∈[S,S]
sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S, γ) = sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S∗, γ) = µ̂S∗.
In fact, Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the following intersection theorem
([15], Theorem 3). We formulate it in a slightly weaker form.
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Theorem 2 (Ha, 1980). Let E, F be Hausdorff topological vector spaces, X ⊂ E
be a convex compact set, Y ⊂ F be a convex set. Let B ⊂ A ⊂ X × Y be subsets
such that
(a) for each y ∈ Y the set {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ A} is closed;
(b) for each x ∈ X the set {y ∈ Y : (x, y) 6∈ A} is convex;
(c) B is closed in X × Y and for each y ∈ Y the set {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ B} is
nonempty and convex.
Then there exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that {x∗} × Y ⊂ A.
Proof of Theorem 1. The topological vector spaces (E, τw), (F, τ) and sets
X = [S, S], Y , introduced above, satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2. Put
A = {(S, γ) ∈ X × Y : Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ λ}.
Condition (a) of Theorem 2 is satisfied since Ψ̂(·, γ) is τw-lower semicontinuous
and the validity of (b) follows from the quasiconcavity of Ψ̂(S, ·):
{γ ∈ Y : (S, γ) 6∈ A} = {γ ∈ Y : Ψ̂(S, γ) > λ}.
Furthermore, consider the set-valued mapping B̂ from Y to the power set of
X , defined as follows
B̂(γ) =
(
{St}I{∆γt<0} + {St}I{∆γt>0} + [St, St]I{∆γt=0}
)T
t=0
and denote by B the graph of B̂:
B = {(S, γ) ∈ X × Y : S ∈ B̂(γ)}.
For (S, γ) ∈ B we have
XT (γ) = 1 +
T∑
t=0
(St(∆γt)
− − St(∆γt)
+) = 1−
T∑
t=0
St∆γt = 1 + (γ ◦ S)T (2.8)
and Φ(XT (γ)) = Ψ(S, γ) ≤ λ. Thus, Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ λ and B ⊂ A.
We claim that B satisfies condition (c) of Theorem 2. Cleary, the sets {S ∈
X : (S, γ) ∈ B} = B̂(γ) are nonempty and convex. It remains to prove that B
is closed in X × Y . Let (S, γ) ∈ X × Y lie in the closure of B in the product
topology τw × τ , restricted to X ×Y . To prove that (S, γ) ∈ B it is sufficient to
show that
StI{∆γt 6=0} = StI{∆γt<0} + StI{∆γt>0}, t = 0, . . . , T. (2.9)
For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, n ∈ N and gt ∈ L∞(Ft) there exist γn ∈ Y and
Sn ∈ [S, S] of the form
Sn = SI{∆γn<0} + SI{∆γn>0} + Ŝ
nI{∆γn=0}, S ≤ Ŝ
n ≤ S
such that ρ(γnt , γt) < 1/n, |E(S
n
t − St)gtI{∆γt 6=0}| < 1/n, where ρ is defined
by (2.2). Passing to subsequences (still denoted by γnt , S
n
t ), we may assume
that γnt → γt P-a.s. Here γ
n
t , γt are understood as functions, taken from the
correspondent equivalence class.
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On the set {∆γt 6= 0} we have
I{∆γn
t
<0} → I{∆γt<0}, I{∆γnt >0} → I{∆γt>0}, I{∆γnt =0} → 0 P-a.s.
From the the dominated convergence theorem it follows that
lim
n→∞
E
(
gt(StI{∆γnt <0} + StI{∆γnt >0})I{∆γt 6=0}
)
= E(gt(StI{∆γt<0} + StI{∆γt>0}),∣∣∣E(gtŜnt I{∆γnt =0}I{∆γt 6=0})∣∣∣ ≤ E (|gt|StI{∆γnt =0}I{∆γt 6=0})→ 0.
Hence,
E
(
gtStI{∆γt 6=0}
)
= lim
n→∞
E
(
gtS
n
t I{∆γt 6=0}
)
= E
(
gt(StI{∆γt<0} + StI{∆γt>0})
)
for any gt ∈ L∞(Ft) and (2.9) is satisfied.
Now we can apply Theorem 2 and take an element S∗ ∈ X such that {S∗}×Y ⊂
A. That is, Ψ̂(S∗, γ) ≤ λ for all γ ∈ Y and
µ̂S∗ = sup{Ψ̂(S
∗, γ) : γ ∈ Y} ≤ λ.
The reverse inequality is clear. Thus, S∗ is a generalized shadow price.
The equalities in the first line in (2.7) follow from (2.5) and (2.8). Furthermore,
the inequalities
sup
γ∈Y
inf
S∈[S,S]
Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ inf
S∈[S,S]
sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S∗, γ)
are evident and the equality λ = supγ∈Y Ψ̂(S
∗, γ) is already proved. 
In the context of duality theory (see e.g. [25], section 1) the problems
maximize f(γ) = inf
S∈[S,S]
Ψ̂(S, γ) over all γ ∈ Y ,
minimize g(S) = sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S, γ) over all S ∈ [S, S] (2.10)
are said to be dual to each other and the common value (2.7) is called the saddle-
value of Ψ̂. The first of these problems coincides with (2.3).
The function g is lower semicontinuous as the pointwise supremum of a family
of lower semicontinuous functions and the set [S, S] is compact. Hence, the dual
problem (2.10) is solvable. The equality
g(S∗) = sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S∗, γ) = inf
S∈[S,S]
sup
γ∈Y
Ψ̂(S, γ) = λ
shows that generalized shadow prices are exactly the solutions of (2.10).
Theorem 3. A pair (S∗, γ∗) ∈ [S, S]×Y is a saddle point of the relaxed utility
function Ψ̂:
Ψ̂(S∗, γ) ≤ Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗) ≤ Ψ̂(S, γ∗), (S, γ) ∈ [S, S]× Y , (2.11)
if and only if γ∗ is an optimal solution of (2.3): Φ(XT (γ
∗)) = λ and S∗ is a
generalized shadow price.
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Proof. Condition (2.11) can be reformulated as follows:
g(S∗) = Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗) = f(γ∗). (2.12)
Since g(S) ≥ f(γ), (S, γ) ∈ [S, S]×Y it follows that if (S∗, γ∗) is a saddle point of
Ψ̂ then γ∗ is an optimal solution of (2.3) and S∗ is an optimal solution of (2.10)
(or, equivalently, a generalized shadow price). Conversely, if γ∗ is an optimal
solution of (2.3) and S∗ is a generalized shadow price then
λ = g(S∗) ≥ Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗) ≥ f(γ∗) = λ.
Thus, (2.12) holds true and (S∗, γ∗) is a saddle point of Ψ̂. 
The above arguments show that the existence of an optimal solution of (2.3)
is equivalent to the existence of a saddle point of the relaxed utility function Ψ̂.
3. Examples
In the first two examples given below Ψ(·, γ) is τw-lower semicontinuous on
[S, S] and, hence, there exists a shadow price. Note that in these examples the
topological space ([S, S], τw) is first countable and it is enough to show that
Ψ(S, γ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Ψ(Sn, γ), S ∈ [S, S] (3.1)
for any sequence Sn ∈ [S, S], converging to S in τw, to check τw-lower semicon-
tinuity of Ψ(·, γ).
In Example 3 the relaxation Ψ̂ does not coincide with Ψ but S∗ is a shadow
price iff it is a generalized shadow price. Examples 4 and 5 (the last one is
borrowed from [3]) show that even in the case of countable probability space a
shadow price need not exist, while the existence of a generalized shadow price is
ensured by Theorem 1.
In all examples the utility functional Φ is concave and Y = F.
Example 1. Let Ω be finite and let P be striclty positive on the atoms of
FT . Consider a monotone concave function U : R 7→ [−∞,∞) such that U is
finite (and hence continuous) on the open half-line (0,∞) and U(x) = −∞, x ∈
(−∞, 0]. We look for a shadow price in the optimization problem
maximize EU(XT (γ)) over all γ ∈
T−1∏
t=0
L0(Ft)
where XT (γ) is defined by (2.1). The choice of q does not affect anything: q = 1
for instance.
If Ft is generated by the partition (Dit)
mt
i=1 then L
1(Ft) is an mt-dimensional
space. Put f it = ft(ω), ω ∈ D
i
t for ft ∈ L
1(Ft). All Hausdorff vector topologies on
a finite dimensional space coincide ([1], Theorem 5.21). Thus, we can assume that
τwt is the topology of pointwise convergence with a local base at zero generated
by the sets
{f ∈ L1(Ft) : |f
i
t | < 1/n}, i = 1, . . . , mt, n ∈ N.
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To show that Ψ(·, γ) is lower semicontinuous in the product topology τw =∏T
t=0 τ
w
t it is enough to check that (3.1) is true when S
n
t → St pointwise.
If 1 + (γ ◦ S)T (ω) > 0 for all t, ω then the same is true for 1 + (γ ◦ Sn)T (ω)
for sufficiently large n. It follows that
lim
n→∞
Ψ(Sn, γ) = lim
n→∞
EU(1 + (γ ◦ Sn)T ) = EU(1 + (γ ◦ S)T ) = Ψ(S, γ).
On the other side, if 1+ (γ ◦S)T (ω) ≤ 0 for some t, ω then Ψ(S, γ) = Φ(1+ (γ ◦
S)T ) = −∞.
The lower semicontinuity of Ψ(·, γ) implies the existence of a shadow price. A
related result was established in [18].
Example 2. Let Ω be countable and let P be strictly positive on the atoms of
FT . Assume that the processes S, S are bounded: St, St ∈ L
∞(Ft), and consider
the optimization problem
maximize EU(XT (γ)) over all γ ∈
T−1∏
t=0
L∞(Ft)
with a monotone concave (and hence continuous) function U : R 7→ R. We put
q = 1.
If Ft is generated by a partition (D
i
t)i∈Jt, Jt ⊂ N, then for ft ∈ L
1(Ft) we put
f it = ft(ω), ω ∈ D
i
t. Consider on L
1(Ft) the topology τ
p
t of pointwise convergence
with a local base at zero generated by the sets
{f ∈ L1(Ft) : |f
i
t | < 1/n}, i ∈ Jt, n ∈ N.
The topologies τwt = σ(L
1(Ft), L∞(Ft)), τ
p
t are different on L
1(Ft) if the set Jt is
infinite, since τ p is first countable and τw is not (see [1], Theorem 6.26). Clearly,
τ pt ⊂ τ
w
t . It follows that they coincide on the set [St, St] which is τ
w
t -compact
and τ pt -Hausdorff (see [27], section 3.8).
Take a sequence Sn ∈ [S, S], converging to S in the product topology τ p =∏T
t=0 τ
p
t . This amounts to the pointwise convergence S
n
t → St. The correspon-
dent sequence U(1+(γ ◦Sn)T ) is uniformly bounded and Ψ(·, γ) is τ p-continuous
on [S, S]:
lim
n→∞
Ψ(Sn, γ) = lim
n→∞
EU(1 + (γ ◦ Sn)T ) = EU(1 + (γ ◦ S)T ) = Ψ(S, γ)
due to the dominated convergence theorem. This implies the existence of a
shadow price.
A counterexample, given in [3] (see Example 5 below), indicates that the as-
sumptions on boundedness of St, St and finiteness of U cannot be dropped si-
multaneously.
Example 3. Let T = 1, Ω = [0, 1], F0 = {∅,Ω}, and let F1 be the Borel
σ-algebra of [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure P(dω) = dω. Assume that S0 =
S0 = S0, S1, S1 ∈ L
∞(F1) and
S1 − S1 ≥ α > 0
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for some real number α > 0. Consider the optimization problem
maximize EU(X1(γ)) over all γ0 ∈ R (3.2)
with a monotone concave function U : R 7→ R. From (2.1) we get
X1(γ) = 1 + γ
+
0 (S1 − S0)− γ
−
0 (S1 − S0)
Put s = ∞, q = 1. Thus, [S1, S1] is considered as a set in L
1(F1) with the
weak topology τw1 of L
1(F1). We look for the lower semicontinuous envelope of
the functional
S 7→ Ψ(S, γ) = EU(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
defined on the set {S0} × [S1, S1]. This problem reduces to relaxation of the
integral functional
S1 7→ F (S1) =
∫ 1
0
[
U (1 + γ0(S1 − S0)) + δ(S1|[S1, S1])
]
dω, S1 ∈ L
1(F1),
where δ(x|A) = 0, x ∈ A; δ(x|A) = +∞, x 6∈ A since
F (S1) =
{
Ψ(S, γ), S1 ∈ [S1, S1] a.s.,
+∞, otherwise.
Furthermore, the function
f(ω, x) = U (1 + γ0(x− S0)) + δ(x|[S1(ω), S1(ω)])
is Borel on [0, 1] × R and lower semicontinuous in x for each ω. Hence, f is a
normal integrand (see [9], Chapter VIII, Definition 1.1), uniformly bounded from
below. The relaxation of F is given by the formula
F̂ (S1) =
∫ 1
0
f̂(ω, S1(ω)) dω,
where f̂(ω, ·) is the largest convex lower semicontinuous minorant of f(ω, ·) for
each ω: see [9], Chapter IX, Propositions 1.2 and 2.3 or [26], [16] (chapter 2,
section 9) for more general results of this sort. Using the concavity of f(ω, ·) on
[S1(ω), S1(ω)], we conclude that f̂(ω, ·) is linear on this interval:
f̂(ω, S1) = f(ω, S1)
S1 − S1
S1 − S1
+ f(ω, S1)
S1 − S1
S1 − S1
+ δ(S1|[S1, S1]).
Thus, for S1 ∈ [S1, S1] we have
Ψ̂(S, γ) = F̂ (S1) = E
(
U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
S1 − S1
S1 − S1
+ U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
S1 − S1
S1 − S1
)
.
Now assume that the function U is strictly increasing and differentiable and
there exists an optimal solution γ∗0 of (3.2). From Theorem 3 it follows that
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S∗ is a generalized shadow price iff (S∗, γ∗) is a saddle point of Ψ̂. From the
representation
Ψ̂(S, γ) = = E
(
U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))− U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
S1 − S1
S1
+
S1U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))− S1U(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
S1 − S1
)
.
it is clear that the inequality Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗) ≤ Ψ̂(S, γ∗), S1 ∈ [S1, S1] is equivalent to
the condition
S∗1I{γ∗0 6=0} = S1I{γ∗0>0} + S1I{γ∗0<0}. (3.3)
Furthermore, the inequality Ψ̂(S∗, γ) ≤ Ψ̂(S∗, γ∗), γ0 ∈ R reduces to the
condition
∂Ψ̂
∂γ0
(S∗, γ∗) = 0
due to the concavity of Ψ̂(S∗, ·). After elementary calculations we get
∂Ψ̂
∂γ0
(S∗, γ∗) = E ((S1 − S0)U
′(1 + γ∗0(S1 − S0))) = 0 for γ
∗
0 > 0,
∂Ψ̂
∂γ0
(S∗, γ∗) = E
(
(S1 − S0)U
′(1 + γ∗0(S1 − S0))
)
= 0 for γ∗0 < 0,
∂Ψ̂
∂γ0
(S∗, γ∗) = U ′(1)E(S∗1 − S0) = 0 for γ
∗
0 = 0.
Taking into account (3.3), we conclude that the last three equalities are equivalent
to the following one:
∂Ψ̂
∂γ0
(S∗, γ∗) = E ((S∗1 − S
∗
0)U
′(1 + γ∗0(S
∗
1 − S
∗
0))) = 0. (3.4)
Thus, (S∗, γ∗) is a saddle point of Ψ̂ iff the relations (3.3), (3.4) hold true.
From this observation it follows that any generalized shadow price is a shadow
price. Indeed, condition (3.4) ensures that γ∗ is an optimal solution in the
frictionless model with the price process S∗:
EU(1 + γ0(S
∗
1 − S
∗
0)) ≤ EU(1 + γ
∗
0(S
∗
1 − S
∗
0)).
Moreover, in view of (3.3) we have
EU(1+γ∗0(S
∗
1−S
∗
0)) = EU(1+(γ
∗
0)
+(S1−S0)− (γ
∗
0)
−(S1−S0)) = Ψ̂(S
∗, γ∗) = λ.
Hence, although
Ψ̂(S, γ) 6= Ψ(S, γ) = EU(1 + γ0(S1 − S0))
(if, e.g., U is strictly concave), in this example a process S∗ is a generalized
shadow price iff it is a shadow price.
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Example 4. Let Ω = N, T = 1, F0 is generated by the atomsDn = {2n−1, 2n},
n ∈ N and F1 coincides with the power set of N. The probability measure is
defined by P({n}) = 2−n. Put S0 = 1, S0 = 4,
S1 = S1 = S1 =
∞∑
n=1
(
4I{2n} + I{2n−1}
)
.
Since St is bounded we can put s = q = r = ∞. From the definitions of X1(γ)
and S it follows that
X1(γ) = 1 + γ
+
0 (S1 − S0)− γ
−
0 (S1 − S0) ≤ 1.
and γ0 = 0 is an optimal trading strategy for any monotone functional Φ on
L∞(F1).
Denote by LIM : L∞(F1) 7→ R a Banach limit (see e.g. [8], Chapter II,
Exercise 22) and put
Φ(X) = EX + LIM (X).
Clearly, Φ is a linear monotone functional on L∞(F1). We have
λ = sup{Φ(X1(γ)) : γ0 ∈ L
∞(F0)} = 1.
We show that there is no shadow price in this model. Assume first that S0 is
a shadow price which is not equal to the conditional expectation
E(S1|F0) =
∞∑
n=1
E(S1IDn)
P(Dn)
IDn =
∞∑
n=1
4P(2n) + P(2n− 1)
P(2n) + P(2n− 1)
IDn = 2.
If S0 6= 2 on Dn, then putting γ0(i) = 0, i 6∈ Dn; γ0(i) = δ, i ∈ Dn we get
Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)1) = E(1 + γ0∆S1) = 1 + E (γ0 (2− S0)) = 1 + δ (2− S0)P(Dn).
It follows that
µS = sup{Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)1) : γ0 ∈ L
∞(F0)} = +∞.
Now assume that S0 = E(S1|F0) = 2. For γ0 = 1 we have
Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)1) = LIM (1 + ∆S1) =
3
2
.
For computing the value of the Banach limit in the last equality we have used
its shift-invariance property:
2LIM (∆S1) = LIM
∞∑
n=1
(2I{2n} − I{2n−1}) + LIM
∞∑
n=1
(2I{2n−1} − I{2n})
= LIM (1) = 1.
Thus, µS ≥ 3/2 > λ = 1 and S0 = 2 is not a shadow price.
The existence of a generalized shadow price S∗ is guaranteed by Theorem 1.
Let us show that S∗0 = 2. For S0 = 2 we have
Ψ(S, γ) = Φ(1 + (γ ◦ S)1) = LIM (1 + γ0(S1 − S0)).
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Consider a neighbourhood U of S0 in the topology τ
w
0 = σ(L
∞(F0), L1(F0)),
restricted to [S0, S0]:
U = {S ′0 ∈ [S0, S0] : |Egi(S
′
0 − S0)| < ε, i = 1, . . . , m}, gi ∈ L
1(F0), ε > 0.
The set
Un =
{
S ′0 ∈ [S0, S0] : S
′
0 = S0 on
n⋃
j=1
Dj
}
is contained in U for sufficiently large n. Indeed, for S ′0 ∈ Un we have
|Egi(S
′
0 − S0)| ≤
∞∑
j=n+1
|gji ||S
j
0 − S
j
0|P(Dj),
where gji = gi(ω), ω ∈ Dj and S
j
0, S
j
0 are defined similarly. The right-hand side
of the last inequality can be made arbitrary small by an appropriate choice of n.
Take S ′0 ∈ Un ⊂ U such that
1 + γ0∆S
′
1 = 1 + γ
+
0 (S1 − S0)− γ
−
0 (S1 − S0) = X1(γ) on
⋃
j≥n+1
Dj .
Clearly,
Ψ(S ′, γ) = 1 + LIM (γ0∆S
′
1) = LIM (X1(γ)).
It follows that Ψ̂(S, γ) ≤ LIM (X1(γ)) ≤ 1 and S∗0 = 2 determines a generalized
shadow price.
Example 5. Let us reproduce the counterexample of [3]. Put Ω = N, T = 2,
F0 = {∅,Ω}. Let F1 be generated generated by the atoms
Dk = {2k + 1, 2k + 2}, k ∈ N0 := {0} ∪ N,
and let F2 be the power set of N.
Assume that the stock bid prices are falling deterministically: S0 = 3, S1 = 2
S2 = 1 and the ask prices are defined as follows: S0 = 3,
S1 = 2 + k on Dk, k ∈ N0,
S2(ω) = 1 for ω = 2k + 1, k ∈ N0,
S2(ω) = 3 + k for ω = 2k + 2, k ∈ N0.
The probability measure is defined as follows:
P(D0) = 1− 2
−n, P(Dk) = 2
−n−k;
P({2k + 1}) = (1− 2−n−k)P(Dk), P({2k + 2}) = 2
−n−k
P(Dk), k ∈ N0,
where n ∈ N is fixed sufficiently large to make E(S2 − S1|F1) < 0.
The problem cosists in maximization of the logarithmic utility Φ(X2(γ)) =
E ln(X2(γ)) (we put ln x = −∞ for x ≤ 0). Expectation is defined by the
formula
Ef = lim
M→+∞
E(f ∧M).
for any measurable function f with values in the extended real line R ∪ {±∞}.
Particularly, Ef = −∞ if Ef− = +∞.
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The picture and clear economical argumentation, given in [3], show that it is
optimal not to trade at step 0 (γ∗0 = 0) and to go short at step 1 (γ
∗
1 < 0). To
be a bit more formal consider
X2(γ) = 1 +
2∑
t=0
(
St(∆γt)
− − St(∆γt)
+
)
= 1− S0γ0 + S1(γ1 − γ0)
− − S1(γ1 − γ0)
+ + S2γ
+
1 − S2γ
−
1 , (3.5)
where S0 = S0 = S0. It is easy to see that γ0 < 0 leads to a negative value of
X2(γ) for some ω = 2k. Assuming that γ0 ≥ 0, it is not optimal to posses a
positive amount of stock at step 1:
X2(γ) = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 for γ1 = 0;
X2(γ) = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 + (S2 − S1)γ1 ≤ 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 for γ1 ∈ (0, γ0);
X2(γ) = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 + (S2 − S1)γ1 ≤ 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 for γ1 ≥ γ0,
since (S2 − S1)γ1 ≤ (S1 − S1)γ1 ≤ (S1 − S1)γ0 for γ1 ≥ γ0.
Under the assumptions γ0 ≥ 0, γ1 ≤ 0 the expression (3.5) reduces to
X2(γ) = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 + (S2 − S1)γ1 ≤ 1 + (S2 − S1)γ1.
It follows that the maximization of E ln(X2(γ)) can be carried over the set {γ0 =
0, γ1 ≤ 0}:
λ = sup{E ln(X2(γ)) : γt ∈ L
0(Ft), t = 0, 1}
= sup{E ln(1 + (S2 − S1)γ1) : γ1 ∈ L
0(F1,−R+)}. (3.6)
Moreover, since E(S2 − S1|F1) < 0, it is not optimal to do nothing. Denote
by γk1 the value of γ1 on Dk. We have
E ln(1 + (S2 − S1)γ1) =
∞∑
k=0
(
(1− 2−n−k) ln(1− γk1 )
+ 2−n−k ln
(
1 + (1 + k)γk1
))
P(Dk). (3.7)
The optimal portfolio γ∗,k1 < 0 can be obtained by maximizing each term in this
sum. Taking into account that γ∗,k1 ∈ (−(1 + k)
−1, 0), we get an estimate
(1− 2−n−k) ln(1− γk1 ) + 2
−n−k ln
(
1 + (1 + k)γk1
)
≤ (1− 2−n−k)(−γk1 ) ≤
1− 2−n−k
k + 1
which shows that the optimal utility value λ is finite.
Since the optimal strategy γ∗1 < 0, γ
∗
2 = −γ
∗
1 is active, shadow prices S
∗
1 , S
∗
2
should coincide with S1, S2. Otherwise, the same strategy would give strictly
higher utility value in the frictionless market with stock price S∗. But in this
frictionless market the optimal utility value µS∗ is infinite since
1 + γ0∆S
∗
1 = 1− γ0 → +∞, γ0 → −∞.
ON THE GAME INTERPRETATION OF A SHADOW PRICE 15
Thus, there is no shadow price in this model.
However, as we will see shortly, the process S∗ = (S0, S1, S2) is a generalized
shadow price. The point is that in the relaxed problem short selling at step
0 is automatically prohibited. Put s = 0, q = 1 in the notation of Section 2.
By the same reasons as in Example 2, the topology τ pt of pointwise convergence
coincides with the weak topology τwt = σ(L
1(Ft), L∞(Ft)) on the set [St, St]. For
any
∏2
t=0 τ
p
t -neighbourhood U of S
∗ there exist sufficiently large k and S ′ ∈ U
such that S ′1 = S1, S
′
2 = S2 on Dk. We have
1 + (γ ◦ S ′)2 = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 + (S2 − S1)γ1
= (k − 1)γ0 + (I{2k+2} − (k + 1)I{2k+1})γ
k
1 on Dk.
If γ0 < 0, then 1 + (γ ◦ S ′)2(2k + 2) < 0 for large k. Thus,
Ψ(S ′, γ) = E ln(1 + γ ◦ S ′)2 = −∞
and Ψ̂(S∗, γ) = −∞ for any γ0 < 0.
Furthermore,
1 + (γ ◦ S∗)2 = 1 + (S1 − S0)γ0 + (S2 − S1)γ1 ≤ 1 + (S2 − S1)γ1 for γ0 ≥ 0.
It follows that Ψ̂(S∗, (γ0, γ1)) ≤ Ψ̂(S∗, (0, γ1)) and one can assume γ0 = 0 in the
relaxed utility maximization problem (2.6):
µ̂S∗ = sup{Ψ̂(S
∗, γ) : γ0 = 0, γ1 ∈ L
0(F1)}.
To prove that µS∗ = λ, we go back to the ”unrelaxed” frictionless problem:
µ̂S∗ ≤ sup{Ψ(S
∗, γ) : γ0 = 0, γ1 ∈ L
0(F1}
= sup{E ln
(
1 + (S2 − S1)γ1
)
: γ1 ∈ L
0(F1)}.
Looking again at (3.7), we conclude that optimal values γ∗,k1 are negative. Com-
paring the last expression with (3.6), we obtain the inequality µ̂S∗ ≤ λ. The
reverse inequality is evident.
4. Shadow prices via Lagrange duality
As is known, in mathematical economics shadow resource prices are associated
with the optimal solution of the dual problem: see e.g. [19], [10] (Chapter 5).
To avoid conflicts with the terminology of the present paper we, following [24],
use the term ”equilibrium prices” instead. These prices are introduced along the
following lines. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) represent activities of a firm and let f(x)
be the cost of the corresponding operation. The activities are subject to the
resource constraints gi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , m. Put
ϕ(u) = inf{f(x) : gi(x) ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , m}.
The components of a vector λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
m) are called equilibrium resource
prices if the firm cannot reduce the optimal cost of the operation by buying or
16 DMITRY B. ROKHLIN
selling resources at these prices:
ϕ(u) +
m∑
i=1
λ∗iui ≥ ϕ(0), u ∈ R
m.
For a convex problem vectors λ∗ of equilibrium prices are exactly the optimal
solutions of the dual problem (see [24], Theorem 28.2 and Corollary 28.4.1 for
the precise statement).
In the problem under consideration the trader has two resources at his disposal:
bonds and stocks. It is natural to expect that the equilibrium prices of these
resources are related to the shadow price process introduced above.
Assume that Ω is finite, FT coincide with the power set of Ω and P(ω) > 0, ω ∈
Ω. First of all we rewrite the self-financing condition, separating the ”resource
constraints”:
(∆βt − LtSt +MtSt)(ω) ≤ 0, t ∈ 0, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω; (4.1)
(∆γt + Lt −Mt)(ω) ≤ 0, t ∈ 0, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω; (4.2)
− Lt(ω) ≤ 0, −Mt(ω) ≤ 0, t ∈ 0, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω. (4.3)
Here, as above, β−1 = 1, γ−1 = 0. By Lt (respectively, Mt) we denote the number
of stocks sold (respectively, purchased) at time t at price St (respectively, St).
Clearly, passing to the inequality constraints (corresponding to the possibility of
consumption) and allowing the simultaneous transfers from bonds to stocks and
back: LtMt 6= 0 do not increase trader’s monotone utility. We should also take
into account the ”boundary condition”:
γT (ω) = 0, ω ∈ Ω (4.4)
and the ”information constraints”:
(βt, γt, Lt,Mt) ∈ L
0(Ft,R
4), t ∈ 0, . . . , T. (4.5)
Consider a concave utility function U as in Example 1: U is finite on (0,∞)
and U(x) = −∞, x ≤ 0 and denote by C the set of processes (β, γ, L,M),
satisfying (4.5) and such that βT > 0. The problem is to minimize
− EU(βT ) (4.6)
over the set C under the constraints (4.1) – (4.4). Formally, this is an ordinary
convex optimization program ([24], Section 28).
Consider the Lagrange function
L = − EU(βT ) +
T∑
t=0
E(Z1t (∆βt − LtSt +MtSt)) +
T∑
t=0
E(Z2t (∆γt + Lt −Mt))
−
T∑
t=0
E(Z3t Lt)−
T∑
t=0
E(Z4tMt) + E(νTγT ) for (β, γ, L,M) ∈ C. (4.7)
The Lagrange multipliers are represented by a process Zt = (Z
1
t , Z
2
t , Z
3
t , Z
4
t )
with non-negative components: Zt ∈ L0(Ft,R4+), t = 0, . . . , T and νT ∈ L
0(FT ).
Note that the process Z may be assumed adapted since for adapted processes
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(β, γ, L,M) ∈ C the number of constraints in (4.1) – (4.3) for fixed t coincides
with the number of atoms of Ft and Zt can be taken constant on these atoms.
To complete the definition of L, we put in accordance to the general scheme
of [24] (Section 28)
L = +∞, if (β, γ, L,M) 6∈ C;
L = −∞, if (β, γ, L,M) ∈ C, Zt 6∈ L
0(Ft,R
4
+) for some t.
Collecting terms, containing the same elements βt, γt, Lt, Mt, we rewrite (4.7)
in the following way:
L = L1 + L2 + L3,
L1 = E
(
−U(βT ) + Z
1
TβT
)
−
T−1∑
t=0
Eβt∆Z
1
t+1 − EZ
1
0 ,
L2 = EγT (Z
2
T + νT )−
T−1∑
t=0
Eγt∆Z
2
t+1,
L3 =
T∑
t=0
ELt(Z
2
t − Z
1
t St − Z
3
t ) +
T∑
t=0
EMt(−Z
2
t + Z
1
t St − Z
4
t ).
The objective function of the dual problem is given by
g(Z, νT ) = inf{L : (β, γ, L,M) ∈ C}.
Put V (x) = inf
y
(−U(y) + xy). After simple calculations we get
g(Z, νT ) = EV (Z
1
T )− EZ
1
0
if Zt ∈ L0(Ft,R4+), t = 0, . . . , T and the following conditions hold true
E(∆Z1t+1|Ft) = 0, E(∆Z
2
t+1|Ft) = 0, t = 0, . . . , T − 1;
Z2t − Z
1
t St = Z
3
t , −Z
2
t + Z
1
t St = Z
4
t , t = 0, . . . , T ; νT = −Z
2
T .
Otherwise, g(Z, νT ) = −∞.
It readily follows that the optimal value of the dual problem can be represented
as
sup{E(V (Z1T )− Z
1
0) : Z ∈ D}, (4.8)
D = {Z1 ∈M+ : Z
1
t St ≤ Z
2
t ≤ Z
1
t St for some Z
2 ∈M+},
where M+ is the set of non-negative P-martingales. The representations of
this sort are well known: see [5] for continuous time case and [22], [23] for
generalizations in discrete time.
The objective function (4.6) of the primal problem is finite on C and the point
(β, γ), where βt = 1, γt = 0, t = 0, . . . T , belongs to the relative interior of C and
satisfies the constraints (4.1) – (4.4), which are affine. If the optimal value −λ
of the primal problem is finite then there is no duality gap and the dual problem
is solvable ([24], Theorem 28.2 and Corollary 28.4.1). That is,
−λ = sup{E(V (Z1T )− Z
1
0) : Z ∈ D} = E(V (Ẑ
1
T )− Ẑ
1
0)
fo some Ẑ1 ∈ D.
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Let us introduce an adapted process S∗t ∈ [St, St] such that
S∗t Ẑ
1
t = Ẑ
2
t . (4.9)
On the atoms of Ft with Ẑ1t = 0, Ẑ
2
t = 0 the values S
∗
t ∈ [St, St] are chosen
arbitrary. Put
− µS∗ = sup{E(V (Z
1
T )− Z
1
0 ) : Z ∈ D(S
∗)}, (4.10)
D(S∗) = {Z1 ∈M+ : Z
2 = Z1S∗ ∈M+}.
The maximization in (4.10) is carried over smaller set as compared to (4.8),
and the objective functions are the same. Hence, −λ ≥ −µS∗ . On the other
hand, the optimal solution Ẑ of (4.8) is feasible for (4.10): Ẑ1 ∈ D(S∗) since
Ẑ2 = S∗t Ẑ
1
t ∈ M+. It follows that λ = µS∗ . But (4.10) is the dual to the
frictionless optimization problem with the price process S∗. This means that S∗
is a shadow price in the sense of the definition of Section 2.
In fact, we have obtained the same result as in Example 1 (and in [18]). But
formula (4.9) reveals one more interpretation of a shadow price process: it is the
equilibrium bond/stock exchange rate, that is, the relation of stock and bond
equilibrium prices.
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